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I. Introduction

The concept of personhood is a fundamental category related to critical
medical decisions. Experts are unanimously in agreement concerning its
axiological value in regard to bioethical issues. Therefore, there is a
requirement for a precise understanding of its foundation in a biomedical
context. I•S
For example, dementia, "vegetative" states, severe
encephalopathies, etc, are complex medical conditions that lead to a deep
reflection about the very essence of human life. It goes beyond neurology
to the fields of philosophy, theology, bioethics and other disciplines.
The approach to this issue requires a dialogue that proceeds
methodologically by following two steps I: first, it needs to start out from
the phenomenon presented to the field of biomedicine, describing it as
precisely and clearly as possible; secondly, it needs to elaborate and ponder
all the questions that trespass the limits of this field and require an
interdisciplinary approach.
It is particularly important to avoid
imprecision in the first stage of this process. Neurology occupies a
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privileged position in the dialogue with other sciences. This is particularly
so concerning the problem of personhood, which is one of the more central
issues in the interface between medicine and theology.
This article will briefly review a philosophical and theological
tradition in western civilization, which elaborated, with great lucidity, a
unitary concept of the human person. Afterwards, the essential biomedical
facts, which provide a well-defined support to this anthropological view,
will be considered. The confluence of these aspects will delineate an
integrating rationale based on what, in the author' s view, constitutes the
neurological core of personhood. 1-5 Remarkably, these different sources of
knowledge can be finely articulated to shed new light on this central issue.
This provides a new theoretical frame to elaborate a number of
fundamental philosophical and ethical problems.

II. Historical Perspective
The word "soul" has had many different meanings throughout the
history of our civilization. Spirit, breath, vital force, life, creature, reason,
intellect, thought, will, the moral or emotional nature, the totality of the
personal being, are among the attributes related to this word. 6 The study of
its significance leads to terms which are in the origins of our western
culture: basar, nefesh, ruah and feb (these terms have been translated into
the Greek as follows: sarx, psuche, pneuma, kardia, and into Latin as
follows : caro, anima, spiritus, cor or mens).7-9 We will come back to these
terms later on.
A long pre-Aristotelian tradition located the soul between the thorax
and the abdomen, in the diaphragm muscle. The liver, the heart, and finally
the brain were considered at different times and cultures as the bodily
habitat of the soul. 6 In Homer and in the pre-Aristotelian materialist
tradition, the soul was considered as a breath or wrapping of the body, a
kind of force, vapor, specter or ghost, a more subtle material essence. The
air, the fire, or the atoms of the soul were variously considered as the
essential elements by thinkers in this line of thought. According to
lO
Popper even these materialists sustained a dualism in which the soul or
the mind were considered as the essence of the body. In fact, there were
two different notions about this essence, one related to the body and the
other an incorporeal one. This later was developed by Pythagoras and the
Pythagoreans. They considered the essence of things as an abstract reality,
a number or a harmony.
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The Brain as the rector of the body
The idea of the brain as the "locus" of the soul runs through the
centuries, and the most various locations inside this organ were considered
as the seat of the soul not only by philosophers but also by anatomists.
Notably, the Hippocratic medical treatise "About the Sacred Infirmity"
emphatically affirms that the brain "tells the limbs how to act" and also that
the brain "is the messenger of consciousness telling it what occurs.,,11 It is
also described as the interpreter of consciousness.
Plato

Plato conceived the soul in the realm of forms or ideas. 12 His concept
of the mind includes three aspects: reason, appetites and energy. The body
as the prison of the soul, the counter-position between body and matter,
characterizes both his anthropology and his cosmology. The relation
between body and soul is understood in antagonistic, almost hostile terms.
Plato's simile of the soul as the pilot of the body ~oes not have a biological
connotation, as it does in the Aristotelian concept of the soul, which will be
analyzed later on. Death leads to liberation of what is immaterial and
transcendent in human beings; thus the spirit overcomes the slavery of the
material body. With this transit a transformation does not occur, but a
survival of the ideal or incorporeal aspect does. Death affects only the
body. This is a dualist-interactionist conception of the mind-body
relationship. It is also a dualist anthropology.
In contrast to Plato,
Aristotle develops a unitary concept of great transcendence.

Aristotle
According to Aristotle l 3 his predecessors characterized the soul by
three attributes: movement, sensation and incorporality.14 According to
these concepts movement is one of the differential properties between
living and inanimate things. This includes not only movement in its
external manifestations but also other immanent transformations such as
growth, changes in shape, etc. A physiological sense is implicit in
Aristotelian philosophy based on the form -matter relationship.
The
platonic simile of the soul as the pilot of the body received in Aristotle a
meaning both biological and metaphysical: the soul is the unifying
principle of the organism and also the origin of consciousness.
The
concept of "substantial form" refers to the vital principle expressed in the
organization of matter as an organism or functional unit. This organization
implies a relational disposition among the different parts that constitute a
unity and a totality, in a way that cannot be reduced to the mere sum of the
components.
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Life has a triple nature: plants obtain nutrients, they grow and
reproduce themselves; animals feel and move; human beings reason,
remember, know about their existence and have knowledge of their death.
Human beings represent a synthesis of three aspects: the vegetative soul,
the sensitive soul and the intellectual soul. Aristotle introduced the terms
psychic, psychology, psychophysics and psychosomatic.1 5
He wrote, "I think the soul and the body react one on the other by
sympathy. A change in the psychic state produces a change in the form of
the body and, inversely, a change in the form of the body produces a
change in the state of the soul.,,16
Popper lO has commented that Aristotle's essences or irrational souls
are anticipations of the modem theory of the genes: as the DNA they plan
the actions of the organism and guide it towards its "telos", towards its
perfection. In a nutshell, his system considers the human being as a unity,
and the soul is not only the conscious aspect but also the vital integrating
principle.

Descartes
Gilbert Ryle l 7 coined the expression "the ghost in the machine". It
summarizes Descartes' mechanist dualism. 18
The human body is
considered as an automat capable, however, of voluntary movements. The
French thinker considered extension as the essence of corporeality or
materiality. In this, his concept was somehow similar to Aristotelian theory
of prime matter or Plato's concepts about space. Following an ancient
tradition he also sustained the theory that the mind is incorporeal. In
assuming that extension is the essence of materiality, he was obliged to
postulate that the incorporeal substance, the soul, was inextensive, "a
substance which total essence or nature is not but to think, and which in
order to be, does not need any place and does not depend on any material
thing.,,19 Following this line of thought, if interrelations and all causation
in the physical world occur through pressures or impulsions, the mind-body
interaction is only possible in a similar way. He was an interactionistdualist who developed, on this premise, a mechanist theory of the mindbody interrelation. 10
In Descartes the interrelation of the inextensive soul with the body
occurs, however, through an extensive structure: the pineal gland. To
modem neo-Cartesians this interaction can occur through different portions
of the brain.
Penfield 20 considered the "centroencephalon" as the key
structure for this interaction. According to Ecc\es 21 it is the zone of
language in the "dominant" hemisphere. According to Penfield's concept,
disanimation of the body would require the destruction of most of the brain.
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Eccles' theory would require destruction of a very restrictive area of the
brain hemispheres.
The concept of the soul as a vaporous entity, shade or specter and its
entification or reification lead to undervaluing or disregarding the
biological substratum. It also implies that the soul is a separable entity in a
relation of juxtaposition with the body. Just to mention an example, a
practical consequence of this dualist and mechanistic view is the
requirement that every part of the organism must die before death can be
certain, or an arbitrary selection of which portion determines the link
between the two separable aspects. 22
Descartes' mechanistic world and his problematic interactions dualism
according to which the body-mind relation occurs as an extrinsic
juxtaposition, create the possibility for a dissociation between the moment
when the "spirit" abandons the "machine" and the destruction or cessation
of functioning of the machine itself. In other words, disanimation of the
body becomes a speculative problem beyond the field of medicine?2 This
situation leads to a separation between the biological basis of death and its
philosophical and theological significance. Therefore, according to this
position, the presence or absence of the soul in the body is irrelevant from
the physiological point of view. Hence, the philosophical origin of certain
positions,23,24 according to which it is possible to separate the concepts of
personhood and death from the mere biological functioning of the
organism, can be understood.

III. The Theological Perspective
Two central problems must be coherently and comprehensively
articulated by theology: the anthropological issue of the deep identity of
man; and the problem of the meaning and truth of human existence.
The human being is the summit of the creation, he gathers in himself
the unity of the material and the spiritual aspects. 25 According to Thomas
Aquinas, the human person is "the horizon of creation, where the heavens
and the earth are united; as a link between time and eternity; as a synthesis
of the creation.,,26
It has also been expressed this way: "in the unity of body and soul, the
man, because of his bodily condition, is a synthesis of the material
universe.,,27 The situation of the human beings in the universe is not a mere
accident but it is part of their essential reality.28 "The Lord God formed the
man from the dust of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of
life, and the man became a living being" (Gn. 2:7). This passage from the
book of Genesis expresses the constitution of man by two co-principles
(matter and spirit), as well as his essential unity with the rest of creation.
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Considered from a merely biological point of view, he lacks a specifically
super-specialized functional constitution . However, he creates a specific
human cultural environment and his technological enterprise becomes a
powerful tool. He not only transcends the physical world but he can also
open himself to a transcendent and infinite personal reality.
According to his relational essence - in the image of God - man can
transcend biological and sociological conditioning in a search that has its
natural horizon in God himself. 8,29 He has been called to be the steward of
the creation, a collaborator with God. The man, a finite being, is loved by
God in himself and as whole, and he is endowed with a capacity for
freedom and spontaneity.8,29
In his search he always makes new
synthesis. 28 The unity of the human person is theologically axiomatic. On
the basis of this unity the possibility exists for him to find a realization in
the created world, in relationship with the Creator and with his fellow
human beings.
But what is the real foundation of this unity? The
theological foundation cannot be found but in Christology: "only Christ
Man recognizes in Christ his
reveals man to man himself...,,27
anthropological status, his freedom , his dignity and his supernatural
destiny.

The Semitic anthropology
Looking into the Judeo-Christian tradition it is possible to find an
understanding of the human being coherent with the knowledge provided
by science today. To modern eyes, the picture of man presented in
Scripture appears impressively realistic . It catches both the complexity and
plurality of his dimensions while affirming at the same time the unity of the
human person.7-9 It opens the door to a deeper understanding of the reality
of man: both from an empirical point of view and from the perspective of
his metaphysical structure. 7-9 Man's intimate unity is essential to his
quality of being "capax Dei" which makes him destined to enter, as a
whole, into an interpersonal communion with God.
Let us briefly review the anthropological terms in the Bible. They
refer to the totality of the human being as a unity, described from different
points of view. Four terms are used in Scripture: basar, nefesh, ruah and
feb (these terms have been translated into the Greek as follows: sarx,
psuche, pneuma, kardia, and into the Latin as follows : caro, anima,
. •
7-9
SpirituS, cor or mens.

Basar: The flesh-man (Greek: sarx) emphasizes the relation of man with
the material world, his mortality. Man is reduced to his earthly empirical
existence. Man does not have a body, he is a body. The biological man
exposed to suffering and disease, temptation and sin. The term also refers

76

Linacre Quarterly

to man inasmuch as he lives only in a self-centered dimension without
opening to the other and to God. This term also marks the bodily condition
of man, the body-man (Greek: soma),7-9 the man as a whole, in his relations
with the others; it can frequently be translated as "I". It is close to the
meaning of our concept of personality.

Nefesh: The soul-man (Greek: psuche)7-9 makes reference to the conscious
identity: "I", the entire man as a human being. Man does not have life, he
is life. It also captures man ' s involvement in history, his psycho-social
dimension and his responsibility in this sphere.

Ruah: The spirit-man (Greek: pneuma)7-9 denotes his difference with the
material world, his affinity toward God, his capacity to enter a deep
communion with the deepest aspects of reality, and with the Creator. It is
the "soul-body-man" living in a new dimension .

Leb: this term refers to the synthesis of emotion and reason as well as to the
physical and spiritual aspects and the interpenetration of these constituent
dimensions. 7-9
Frequently the word soul is interchangeable for life in the English
translations (for example, Mark 8:36, Luke 12 :20, etc.). The Hebrew
anthropologist understands the human being as a uni-totality. He is, "as a
whole" body, soul, spirit; however, this does not mean unicity or
uniformity. Two existential options are presented to him : as "flesh-man"
he is closed to the neighbor and to God; conversely, as a "spirit-man" he is
open to God who concedes him fullness and immortality.8

The central events in the Christian faith
Christ's death and resurrection, doubtless the central events in the
Christian faith , are articulated in terms of the Semitic anthropology. The
redemption and the expression of the person "as a whole" through the
resurrection constituted the anthropological novelty and the center of the
Christian message, not the immortality of the soul according to the platonic
philosophy,8,29 which ignores the dignity of the body. Conversely, the
preaching of the apostles recognizes the body as "the temple of the Spirit"
(I Co. 3: 16). For example, the classic definition of death as no more than
the separation of the soul from the body, following the platonic influence,
recognizes a spiritual and transcendent dimension in the human being, but
it does not capture the richness revealed in the resurrection; it is
anthropologically incomplete. It implies that death affects only the body
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while the soul remains intact. With this, man would abandon one essential
aspect of his anthropological status: his corporeality.
Christ's resurrection indicates that death affects the totality of man
and not only his "body. ,, 8,29 The concept of the body must be reconsidered
as a constituent and essential part of the soul. Thus, the center of the
Christian preaching is not in just one aspect of the human person; it
encompasses the totality. The final and full expression of the human
redemption does not imply the abandonment of the body but its complete
assumption and liberation in God and for God.8 The apostle Paul talks
about a "spiritual body", which is only apparently contradictory. The
contradiction exists between spirit and "flesh" but not between spirit and
body. The natural body can be transformed into a glorified or pneumatic
body (I Cor. 15).
The person reaches his goal when he becomes full of the divine
reality and overcomes all his alienations. It is the definite entrance of man
in his fullness into the kingdom of God. This is what is implicit - after a
closer scrutiny - in the word soul when it is used to note the dynamic
principle in the human being that makes them move towards an insatiable
search for the infinite. Finally, with death, all that is essential and
transcendent may crystallize.8 According to this spiritual dimension,
human beings can transcend the domain of what is merely physical to reach
a new mansion, a transfigured body. Moreover, the Christian message
introduces a more encompassing dimension . The resurrection does not
concern only man in his more nuclear aspect, but with the consummation of
the world the whole creation will be redeemed, and his country, the
"cosmos", will be transformed "so that God may be all in all" (I Co.
15:28). The unity of man with the universe will be consummated (Ro 8:
21).
The essential aspects of the Judeo-Christian tradition have been
considered, as well as the central events of the Christian faith. They
provide the key to interpret Pope Pius XII words in his "Replies to Some
Important Questions Concerning Reanimation,,30 in 1957, establishing that
"it was the province of physicians, and particularly of the anesthetist, to
give a clear and accurate defin it ion of ' death ' and of the ' moment of death '
He conceived a
when a patient passed away while unconscious."
disintegration as equivalent to the death of the person "even if certain
organs continue to function ." These statements presuppose the essential
unity of the human person. They indicate that loss of personhood and
death are coincident and inseparable.
It is important now to analyze how the above-considered tradition is
articulated with the theological and anthropological principle of the unity
of the human person in Thomas Aquinas' conception. Finally, it will
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become evident how these aspects are coherently interrelated with a new
rationale based on current biomedical knowledge.
IV. The Thomist Tradition

Thomas Aquinas re-approached and transformed the categories of the
Aristotelian philosophy, the relationship between matter and form known
as Hylemorphism (Greek "hyle" and "morphe" form). He developed a
concept that defines the plural unity of the human person. He resolved the
arduous problem of a relation that could save on one side the distinction of
the components and on the other the unity of man's personal being. 31 This
conception became part of patrimony of the Christian faith as it is in
consonance with the Biblical model.
Thomas Aquinas' anthropology has two fundamental aspects: First,
"The doctrine of the human nature as a unity of 'soul and body' which
explains the intelligibility of the human being and his history". The second
aspect is "the doctrine of the person which in a special mode orients us
from the ethical point of view and in relation to the way of the person in the
plane of the creation and of the Christian salvation.,,31 These two aspects
have axiologic value.
Aquinas retook and elaborated Boecio's formula. The person is
"individua substancia rational is natura" .
Let us summarize it.32
Substantiality indicates the ontological substratum of the person. The
person as a whole is greater than the mere sum of any of the constitutive
aspects. The identity of the person subsists as superior to the expressions
of any particular act. The individuality points out the distinction of every
man as a unique and irrepeatable living being, the biological and corporal
status. Rationality is an essential attribute of man. It is not dependent on
the actual capacity of expression in a certain moment or circumstance. The
status of personhood is related to the specific constitution of the human
individual. It is not determined by the acts of the person.
Contribution of Thomism to a unitary doctrine of the human person
The Thomist conception articulates both the biological and spiritual
dimension of the human being. The main concepts can be summarized as
follows:
(a) The human person is a unity of differentiated dimensions. The soul is
the "substantial form of the body" . It is the source of self-consciousness as
well as the vital principle, which unifies the body.
(b) The head is the critical portion that determines the life and unity of the
human body.33
(c) Substantial changes occur as instant transitions.
February, 2001
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The soul as the "substantial form of the body"
According to the Aristotelian tradition, man is a synthesis of three
34
aspects: the vegetative life, the sensitive soul, and the intellectual soul.
Thomas Aquinas developed a unitary theory. He clarified the fact that
though there are three conceptually differentiable levels, there is only one
soul and not three. The unity and totality of the body is greater than the
sum of its components. The ontological level pertinent to the human
person includes the convergence of these aspects. The man is not
conformed by the sum of two different essences, that is, soul and body.
Spirit and matter are, more precisely, the two co-principles that constitute
man as a unity and a totality. The soul is the "substantial form of the
body". The body is realization and expression of the spirit.
Shewmon 33 has noted the affinity between current biological concepts
and the Aristotelian-Thomist conception of the soul as "substantial form"
of the body. In living organisms a constant and dynamic exchange of
atoms and molecules occurs, which includes all the tissues and organs of
the organism. It encompasses even the more seemingly static components
as the bones and the nervous tissue. After a certain time, the original atoms
and molecules are replaced by different ones. However, the organism
remains the same due to a conservation of relations at the atomic,
molecular and biological levels. This implies a persistence of the form of
the body throughout time. This is an essential or "substantial" aspect.
Shewmon has noted the similarity of the Aristotelian-Thomist concepts
with certain modem analysis of the vital processes. This author quotes
Varela35 who has developed the concept of "autopoiesis" or "autopoietic
mechanism" to describe the essence of living organisms. According to
Varela, "an autopoietic machine continuously generates and specifies its
own organization throughout its operation as a system of production of its
own components, and it does this in an endless exchange of components
under conditions of continuous perturbations and compensations of the
perturbations. Therefore, an autopoietic machine is a homeostatic system
(or rather a relation-static system) that has its own organization (defining
networks of relations) as the fundamental invariant". From a biological
point of view, this description, along with the organizational principle it
implies, has a great similarity with the Aristotelian-Thomist concept of
"substantial form of the body".
The head as the critical portion which determines the life and unity of
the human person.
Thomas Aquinas considered the head as the critical portion in the
human body.33 According to him, it is "the seat of consciousness," but at
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the same time, "no other external portion is related to the integrity of the
organism in the same way as the head. ,,37 Thus, the essence of the body as
animated matter, the body-soul unity, ceases with the absence of
respiration, "not because this is the means of union but because of the
remotion of that disposition in virtue of which the body is conditioned by
this union.,,38 Therefore, the spiritual faculties in the human beings include
the intellect and the will and, though they are essentially immaterial, they
require an appropriate functioning of the brain.

Substantial changes occur as instant transitions.
According to the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition, things have their
existence in virtue of two principles: matter as pure potentiality and
substantial form , which specifies the substance or essence of the object,
phenomenon or entity. The accidents or properties characterize the object
in its condition as such. Substantial changes occur as a critical series of
accidental changes. They are instantaneous while accidental changes are
continuous. These concepts are relevant to different problems including
the definition of death. 33 It makes intelligible the theological concept of
death as an instant transition and the fact that the soul encompasses the
whole body, and yet, the destruction of only one essential part (the brain)
can lead to the loss of the substantial form of the body as an instantaneous
change. It can be considered a substantial change because it means
dissolution of the essential attributes of the human person: substantiality,
individuality, and rationality. It is coincident with the understanding of
death as an event or transition between the process of dying and the process
of disintegration.38 ,39 This is sustained on neurological, legal, social and
religious grounds. 1-5, 22, 38-40
The Thomist conception harbors the mystery of man as a biological,
psychological and spiritual being. His anthropology "always unites very
closely the consideration of nature and the person, so that nature founds the
objective values of the person, and the person confers a concrete meaning
to the universal values of nature. ,,31

V. The Unity of the Person: the Biomedical Basis
Errors and oversimplifications have not been infrequent concerning
this issue. Let us summarize them: 1-5
(a) The univocal treatment of differentiated hierarchical levels in the
human organism.
(b) The inadequate specification of what function or set of functions
determines the criticality of the brain.
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(c) Exclusively attributing all content of consciousness to the cerebral
neocortex.
(d) Disregarding the encephalization process of arousal in human beings as
one of the aspects of consciousness, as well as the richness of its
components and its contribution to the content of consciousness, and hence
the philosophical and biomedical meaning of this fact.
(e) Considering autonomic integration as brain stem-centered, contrary to
current neuro-physiological knowledge, which shows autonomic
integration as related to hierarchically higher limbic structures.
(f) As a consequence of (c) and (e), a dichotomy: consciousness (cerebral
neocortex)/autonomic integration (brain stem).
(g) Disregarding the integration "as a whole" of these functions.
(h) Finally, as a result of the above, the failure to recognize and make
explicit a fundamental fact: the essential unity of the human person.
Considering fundamental biomedical knowledge the author has
proposed the concept of a system that, from a biological point of view,
could be justly considered as "the system of the mind-body unity"
(SMBU).1-5 It captures the idea that the generation of consciousness is
inseparable from the rest of the integrative functions that determine the
capacity of the organism to function "as a whole" . The above essential and
irreplaceable system can be described with a necessary and sufficient level
of resolution. It is composed of the following subsystems:
I) Structures from the ascending reticular activation (sub )system:
nonspecific populations of neurons located in the tegmentum of the rostral
pons and midbrain, the intralaminal and reticularis nuclei of the thalamus
and the posterior hypothalamus.
2) Limbic structures: the hypothalamus, the basal forebrain, the amygdala,
the hyppocampal complex, the cingulum, the septal area, the nucleus
basalis of Meynert and reticularis nuclei in the midbrain and rostral pons.
Also the pedunculopontine nucleus, the rostral raphe nuclei, the
periaqueductal gray and the nucleus locus ceruleus.
3) The cerebral cortex with the thalamus, and basal ganglia.
This system provides the capacity for the following functions:
(I) The generation of consciousness;
(2) Integration and control of the communication systems of the organism
(nervous, hormonal, immune);
(3) Processing, integration and regulation of the afferent flow from, and the
efferent responses to, the whole organism;
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(4) Integration and control of the mechanisms that maintain homeostasis in
the internal environment;
(5) Behavioral and adaptive interactions with the outer world;
(6) The most intimate relation between physiological processes and mental
states;
(7) The integration "as a whole" of each one of the foregoing functions.

A key question that needs to be addressed is whether or not the
interrelation and integration "as a whole" offunctions from (1) to (6) could
be better understood in itself as constituting a function higher than, and
irreducible to, either any of the specific (sub )functions of the system or to
the mere sum of them. Is the interrelation between the processes that
generate these functions the origin of a qualitatively higher functional level
that might constitute the most valid concept to consider the brain as being
above any other organ or system of organs in the organism? Are these
various brain functions simply integrated through their mutual interaction?
Or, are they so closely integrated and mutually enriched in the living brain
that, as a whole, they could be better understood as a global "metafunction"
of the 5MBU?
Modern neuroscience depicts the functions of the brain in a
fragmentary way.41 An explanation as to how all the highly specialized and
apparently fragmentary work of the brain is put together constitutes the
central problem of neurocogniti ve science. This is known as the binding
problem . Specialists concc<de that the solution to this problem may still be
41
far. . 42 However, this is only a first level of the problem related to
consciousness. In a second level, the way the brain integrates and control
"as a whole" its different general functions would have to be approached.
The state of the art in this area should not preclude an approach based on
more general inferences. The more precise knowledge about the brain
achieved during the last few decades is revealing, in general, concerning
the "what" and "where," even when the "how" may represent a much more
complex challenge. An inescapable picture that becomes patent, when the
brain is considered in a more global perspective, is the practically complete
anatomical and physiological correspondence among its different general
functions (see above).
The example that follows indicates the need of keeping sight of the
global perspective. Observations that indicate the impressive capacity of
the brain to integrate and control its function should not be overlooked. It
has been shown that humans can consciously access a great range of brain
functions. One way of achieving this is through conscious sensory
feedback.43. 43 Conscious feedback seems to create spectacular access to
skeletal muscle and to autonomic musculature. Indeed this pattern also
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extends to conditioned immune responses. 45.46 Biofeedback control of
single neurons and populations of neurons is well established . It seems
that, any neuron or population of neurons can come under rapid, precise,
voluntary control when immediate conscious sensory feedback is provided.
To gain control over a single spinal motor unit its electrical activity is
monitored, amplified and played back over headphones; in such a short
period as 30 minutes subjects have been able to play drum rolls using a
single motor unit isolated from adjacent units. Similarly, to gain control
over alpha waves in occipital cortex a tone is sounded when the rhythm is
detected in the EEG, and subjects can learn to increase the amount of alpha
at will after a short period of time. Conscious sensory feedback appears to
be a necessary condition for the establishment of biofeedback control.
This is only one expression of the anatomical and functional
correspondence among the different global functions of the brain. This is
a spectacular capacity of control which reflects the existence of the finest
relation between the system "as a whole" and each one of its most basic
components. There does not seem to exist a convincing explanation of
these observations except that of a powerful functional integration with a
global reach. This knowledge is consistent with what researchers as
Damasio have stated, in the sense that because a theory of consciousness
must show how we acquire a sense of self, it necessarily must consider not
only the brain but also the entire body.41
Further investigation is required to substantiate and develop the above
proposed concept. However, at the very least, it is closer to the anatomical
and physiological reality of the living brain than the dichotomy
cortex=conciousness / brain stem=autonomic integration. It may provide
ground for a precise and explicit rationale concerning the unity of the
human person. It is relevant to the most fundamental bioethical issues
including the formulation of death . It could be the best rationale to
characterize the brain as the essential and highest hierarchical level of
organization in the human organism .
It would provide a clearer
understanding concerning the irreplaceability and criticality of the brain
and the ontological level pertinent to the definition of death. This concept
would provide a coherent explanation as to why the brain is the privileged
organ in which the essential "functional synthesis" of the living human
organism occurs. The destruction of the system with the capacity to
generate its critical "metafunction" would inherently mean the loss of the
essential quality of the organism as a " uni-totality" .
The rationale considered above is relevant to other ethical problems
that include the concept of personhood and the problem of defining
47
health. This rationale would explicitly support the inseparability of both
the loss of personhood and the death of the organism. It would also
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provide a suitable conceptual frame to approach and elaborate a number of
fundamental issues such as the problems of identity and individuality, the
principle of totality, etc. All these aspects still require further neurological
and bioethical investigation .
Thus, this rationale may provide a biomedical foundation to a unitary
concept of the person, which is questioned today by certain positions. This
concept is founded on neurological knowledge and belongs to the field of
biomedicine. At the same time, it remains open and suggestive for those of
us who believe in a transcendent substantiality of the human person, a
metaphysical dimension essentially articulated with the intrinsic biological
unity of the human organism.
The biologicality of the cerebral components, its organicity, is not an
accidental aspect, which could be totally replaced by some sort of artificial
intelligence device at some point in the future .33 The constant metabolic
activity of the brain, the endless exchange of molecules, the constant
remodeling of the cellular structures, the harmonic functioning of the
systems of neurotransmiters, the fascinating complexity of the cerebral
modules, along with the horizontal and vertical organization of the brain,
and its possibility of concerted functioning and adaptive automodification,
all this, constitutes an essential aspect of the capacity of the brain for its
"intelligent" integration and control of the organism, as well as the
expression of the intellectual faculties . This incredible capacity is
genetically codified from the very beginning. There is an immanent
dynamism and potentiality along the continuum of human life, from intrauterus life to adulthood and senescence.

VI. Loss of Personhood is Coincident With
and Inseparable From the Moment of Death
The rationale considered herein provides a suitable conceptual frame
to approach and elaborate a number of fundamental issues such as the
problems of identity and individuality, the principle of totality ("the whole"
is greater than the extrinsic sum of the parts or the acts), etc. This concept
allows greater precision in approaching the problem of the definition and
determination of death. It separates death from a number of "limitsyndromes" like the "vegetative" states, severe states of dementia, severe
encephalopathies, and primary brain stem death. lo5 It is not possible to
dissociate personhood either from consciousness or from the biological
capacity of the organism to function as a unity and a totality, as both
aspects have a common neurological basis. It is evident the coincidence of
the death of the individual - at the same time human being and person -
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with the death of the organism. Biomedical knowledge confirms what is
theologically axiomatic: the unity of the human person.

VII. Conclusion
A concept of personhood based on the intrinsic biological unity of
human beings is not of little importance to understanding human life and
death, as well as a number of fundamental biomedical problems. A
tradition of philosophic and theological thought meets the anthropological
principle of personhood as a unity of differentiated dimensions. This unity
does not imply either uniformity or unicity. The rationality considered
herein supports the above-mentioned anthropological principle from a
biomedical perspective. It provides a synthesis, which constitutes an
adequate conceptual frame to re-approach a number of issues currently
treated - by certain trends - in a reductionist way. The concept of a
critical metafunction in the human brain is fundamental if one is to
understand the unity of the human person, which has axiological value to
elaborate a number of issues in the interface between biomedicine and
theology. This concept can be articulated with a historical tradition of
thought in western civilization.
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